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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a tendency for society to blindly accept new technology,
especially technology designed to enhance the quality of life. In our
increasingly crime-burdened cities, people jump at methods that can
identify perpetrators conclusively. Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)
technology, when used correctly, allows for unquestioned identifica-
tion of evidentiary samples recovered from crimes scenes when com-
pared to samples from a defendant.' As no two people, other than
identical twins, have the same genetic structure,' DNA fingerprinting
tests, when properly conducted, provide the mechanism through
which this technology may be applied.
Although the theory supporting DNA fingerprinting is generally
accepted as capable of producing extremely reliable results,3 and there
is little doubt as to the revolutionary effect DNA fingerprinting could
potentially have on paternity and criminal cases,4 the process followed
in obtaining the results must be carefully examined. Therefore, a
New York court in the case of People v. Castro,' correctly and wisely
pulled in the reigns on the use of DNA fingerprinting analysis in the
courtroom by refusing to admit DNA fingerprinting tests into evi-
dence in a murder trial.
The theory and technology of DNA fingerprinting far surpass
everyday knowledge. In fact, only those specifically trained in molec-
ular biology and chemistry can even begin to understand the concepts
1. Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 46 (1989).
2. G. ALEXANDER, GENERAL BIOLOGY 504 (1962).
3. Lewin, DNA Fingerprinting on the Witness Stand, 244 SCIENCE 1033 (1989).
4. Id.
5. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 540 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
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involved.6 Traditional fingerprinting, by comparison, involves a fairly
simple visual comparison.7 Similarly, most of us are at least aware of
the various blood types that exist in the population and are capable of
viewing such evidence with only a minimal risk of dangerous preju-
dice. These scientific techniques can be easily verified by the court
involved.' However, DNA fingerprinting evidence cannot be verified
by the court and, thus, requires a "total reliance on the expert's
assumptions."9
DNA fingerprinting is not a common procedure. Additionally,
the probabilities involved, for example one in 189,200,000, effectively
serve as a death knell to defense cases.' 0 Scientific evidence can
"assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury of lay-
men."" This "aura of scientific infallibility may shroud the evidence
and thus lead the jury to accept it without critical scrutiny."' 2
This Comment examines the role DNA fingerprinting has
assumed in the legal community and the potential problems that
accompany it as it moves from the laboratory to the courtroom. Sec-
tion II provides a brief overview of the theory behind DNA finger-
printing, standards for the admissibility of novel scientific evidence as
set forth by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia in Frye v. United States,'3 and, in particular, the application
of those standards to the admission of DNA fingerprinting evidence.
Section III focuses on Castro and the important shift it provides in the
examination of DNA fingerprinting by narrowing the question of
admissibility to the application, as opposed to the existence, of gener-
ally accepted theories and techniques. Section IV provides standards
by which to judge DNA fingerprinting evidence in future cases to
ensure that its admissibility as a probative tool is not abused and that
irregularities in testing procedures will be uncovered. Section V con-
cludes that DNA fingerprinting is a technique that is and will con-
tinue to be a powerful evidentiary tool-provided that it is subject to
6. Thompson & Ford, supra note 1, at 56.
7. See Gianelli, The Admissibility ofNovel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, A
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1200-02 (1980). The science of fingerprint
comparison typically involves visual inspection of sets of fingerprints and a search for similiar
patterns. Photographic enlargements of evidentiary fingerprints can facilitate the comparison
by magnifying the similarities or differences.
8. Id. at 1204.
9. People v. Marx, 54 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (1975).
10. Thompson & Ford, supra note 1, at 56.
11. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
12. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1237.
13. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
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strict scrutiny regarding the appropriate standards and procedures
used in each particular test conducted.
II. OVERVIEW
A. History of DNA Fingerprinting
DNA, deoxyribonucleic acid, is a long chain of molecules found
in the nucleus of most cells of all living organisms.14 Each chain is
arranged 'in a ladder-like configuration in which nucleotide base pairs
form the rungs.15 There are only four different bases in DNA which
bind to form the base pairs, yet the order in which these base pairs are
arranged along the ladder is different in the DNA of every human
being. 16 A single molecule of DNA may have as many as three billion
base pairs, or rungs, providing a virtually infinite set of DNA mole-
cules. 17 Within a given person, however, the order of the base pairs is
the same in every cell of the body.I8 It is this premise on which DNA
fingerprinting is based. Evidentiary samples found at crime scenes
(i.e., blood stains, hair, or semen) that contain DNA, therefore, con-
tain information that can positively identify the source of the sam-
ple.19 Scientists have developed techniques which allow the DNA
found in evidentiary samples to be compared to the DNA of a victim
or a defendant.20
14. G. ALEXANDER, supra note 2, at 48.
15. Id. at 504.




20. Thompson & Ford, supra note 1, at 50, 64-80. The techniques produce
autoradiographs, or "autorads," which are, in essence, pictures of the DNA that is
fingerprinted. Scientists compare the autorads of the evidentiary sample to an autorad of
genetic material obtained from an individual to determine if there is a match. Autorads are
generated by a ten-step process, briefly described below:
I. Extraction of DNA: The evidentiary sample is exposed to chemicals
and enzymes. The cells are burst open releasing the DNA contained therein.
The DNA is then chemically separated from the other cell material.
Id. at 65.
2. Digestion: The separated DNA is exposed to restriction enzymes, spe-
cific proteins that recognize base pair sequences in the separated DNA and "cut"
the DNA strands at all the places along the DNA strand where the base
sequence exists. This process produces various length DNA strands known as
Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphisms, or RFLPs. Two different samples
of DNA originating from the same source will produce RFLPs that are the same
length in each sample. The RFLPs produced in samples from different sources
will be different in length and number.
Id. at 67-68.
3. Gel Electrophoresis: The RFLPs are then sorted according to size by
gel electrophoresis. In this process, an agar gel is placed in an electric field. The
1990]
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In this sense, DNA fingerprinting is similar to its namesake,
RFLPs from the samples to be compared are then placed in lanes at the nega-
tively charged end of the gel. Since DNA is negatively charged, the RFLPs will
migrate to the positively charged end of the gel. The shorter the RFLP, the
easier it can move through the gel, and thus, the RFLPs are separated by size as
they migrate. After an appropriate time, the gel is removed from the electric
field, trapping the different length RFLPs at different spots in the gel.
Id. at 69-70.
4. Staining: The gel is treated with an Ethydium Bromide stain which the
DNA absorbs. Exposure to ultraviolet light will then reveal the position of DNA
on the gel.
Id. at 70.
5. Denaturation: The stained DNA in the gel is exposed to chemicals that
denature it. That is, the chemicals split the double helix configuration of the
DNA molecules into two, separate, single strands.
Id.
6. Blotting: In a technique known as "Southern Transfer," a nylon mem-
brane is placed in contact with the agar gel. The RFLPs in the gel are trans-
ferred to the membrane in exactly the same position relative to each other that
they occupied on the gel.
Id. at 70-71.
7. Hybridization: The denatured (single strand) RFLPs are exposed to
radioactively marked probes. Probes are small, single-stranded DNA chains of a
known sequence. They will attach to their complimentary sites on the RFLPs
wherever that complimentary site exists. Where the complimentary site is not
found, no hybridization occurs. Then the membrane is then washed and exposed
to different probes, marking additional spots on the RFLPs.
Id. at 71-74.
8. Autoradiograph: The membrane containing the now radioactively
marked RFLPs from the samples to be compared are placed on film. The radio-
actively marked RFLPs expose the film producing bands. This exposed film is
called an autoradiograph.
Id. at 74.
9. Interpreting the Autoradiograph: The exposed film is then visually
examined to compare the bands present in different lanes. If the lanes contain
samples originating from the same source, the autorad should show bands of the
same size and number in the same location in each lane. If the samples originate
from different sources, the bands will appear at different locations in each lane.
The bands are then measured manually or by a digitizer attached to a computer
to determine if they are indistinguishable.
Id. at 74-76.
10. Population genetics: Should the lanes show a match, the results must
be analyzed according to the principles of population genetics to determine the
frequency of such a match occuring in the general population. The application of
population genetics is not necessary if no match is observed as the samples would
be excluded as originating from the same source. For example, if the bands that
matched were known to show the existence of the A blood type allele in the
source, the results would not be very helpful when taken alone as approximately
40% of the general public would show a similar match. Alternatively, if a match
is declared for an allele that is present in only .000001% of the population, the
test is tremendously helpful as the odds that a match occurred coincidentally are
greatly reduced. The more alleles tested, the smaller the chance that observed
matches were due to coincidence.
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traditional fingerprinting. For over 100 years, law enforcement agen-
cies have recognized traditional fingerprinting as an infallible method
of identification because of the unique pattern of each fingerprint.2
However, fingerprints may be difficult or impossible to recover at a
crime scene, or the defendant may explain their presence as innocent.
For example, a neighbor charged with murder could explain his
finngerprints in the bedroom of the murder victim as the result of
assisting the victim with a recent furniture move.22
The British geneticist Alec Jeffreys first developed the techniques
employed in DNA fingerprinting.23 Originally, these techniques
helped scientists pinpoint the locations of specific genes in a DNA
molecule. 24 DNA fingerprinting first was utilized in the legal arena as
a tool for identifying parents in paternity suits. 25 Its great potential
for accuracy eventually led prosecutors to use DNA fingerprinting in
the identification of the source of evidentiary samples found at crime
scenes.26 These attempts raised the question of the applicable stan-
dards in determining the admissibility of DNA fingerprint based
evidence.
B. The Frye v. United States Standard
In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia in Frye v. United States ruled that a lie detector test, known
as a systolic blood pressure deception test, was inadmissible as evi-
dence in a criminal proceeding.27 The Frye court held that this early
version of a lie detector test, based on the theory that truth is sponta-
neous and lying requires concious effort, was not founded on accepted
scientific theory.28 The holding has become the standard by which
most courts judge the admissibility of novel scientific evidence.29
In Frye, the court stated that "just when a scientific principle or
discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable
Id. at 76-79.
It is this application of allele frequencies observed in the general public that leads to a
conclusion. This conclusion is usually given in the form of a ratio showing the frequency of
occurrence of the applicable alleles in the general public. This is the origin of the one in
189,200,000 figure presented in the Lifecodes report.
21. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1220.
22. Lewin, supra note 3, at 1034.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl S, 140 Misc. 2d 299, 532 N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
26. Lewin, supra note 3, at 1034.
27. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
28. Id.
29. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1208.
1990]
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stages is difficult to define."' 3° The court added that "while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well rec-
ognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the
deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs."31
General acceptance of a proposed theory or technique in the sci-
entific community soon became the standard of admission for novel
scientific evidence.32 This basic standard is still used today. Later
courts, however, expanded upon the general acceptance principle and
formulated a three-prong test for the determination of the admissibil-
ity of novel scientific evidence.33
The first prong asks whether there is a generally accepted theory
in the scientific community that supports the contention proposed.34
The next prong asks whether there are existing techniques or proce-
dures generally accepted in the scientific community which are capa-
ble of producing reliable results. 35  The final prong examines the
accepted scientific procedures and techniques to insure that they are
followed correctly in each particular case.36
The lie detector test proposed in Frye failed at the first prong
level. The theory that lying requires conscious effort and results in
elevated blood pressure had not "gained such standing and scientific
recognition among physiological and psychological authorities. ' 37
The court stated that this lack of general acceptance by the scientific
community made it impossible to justify admitting the results of the
test.
The County Court for Dade County, Florida, in State v. Agui-
lera,38 provides an example of novel scientific evidence failing to pass
the second prong. The Aguilera court found evidence of speeding pro-
vided by radar detection units inadmissible because the current tech-
30. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
31. Id.
32. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1201.
33. See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (denying admissibility of scientific
evidence where validity of underlying theory was in question); State v. Aguilera, 48 Fla. Supp.
207 (Dade County Ct. 1979) (denying admissibility of scientific evidence where validity of
techniques used in radar detection devices was questioned in the scientific community); State v.
Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1979) (holding that improper application of valid techniques was
grounds for denying admission of drug identification tests).
34. See, e.g., Aguilera, 48 Fla. Supp. at 207 (finding that radar speed measuring devices in
their "present" modes were not reliable "beyond and to the exclusion" of a reasonable doubt).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
38. Aguilera, 48 Fla. Supp. at 207.
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nology involved was unreliable.3 9 The court stated that the theory
behind radar detection of speeding had reached a level of general
acceptance in the scientific community, thus satisfying the first prong.
The court added, however, that the reliability of the devices "has not
been established beyond and to the exclusion of every reasonable
doubt."'  In other words, the second prong was not satisfied because
the techniques used to apply the accepted theory were not reliable.
As technology improved and techniques approached theory, the sec-
ond prong obstacle was no longer a valid objection to the use of radar
speed detection evidence. These technological advancements have
forced any objections to radar evidence to be based on the third prong
issue of application of acceptable techniques-i.e., correct operation
of the radar gun.
Similarly, in State v. Vail,4" the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that certain drug testing techniques were unreliable, and that the use
of those techniques to identify controlled substances was inadmissible.
Though the theory existed in the scientific community that would
allow for the identification of controlled substances, the second prong
was not met where the techniques employed could not identify the
tested substance beyond a reasonable doubt. 2 Expert testimony sug-
gested that the thin layer chromatography tests used to identify drug
samples as marijuana were not appropriate because the chemicals
used in the technique provided an error rate that was unacceptable
regardless of whether or not the proper procedures were followed. 3
The reliability of the techniques was insufficient to positively identify
the tested substances."
In essence, once the first two prongs are satisfied, admission of
novel scientific evidence becomes and remains a third prong question
in all cases. Assuming the same techniques are employed, admission
simply becomes a question of application. The court must examine
each particular case to determine if the proper techniques were fol-
lowed. An example of failing the third prong is provided by United
States v. Ridling.45 The Ridling-court suggested that even if a gener-
ally accepted theory existed and acceptable procedures were available,
a test would be unreliable (and its results inadmissible) where, for
instance, the scientific procedure required the use of machines and the
39. Id. at 208.
40. Id. at 210.
41. State v. Vail, 274 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1979).
42. Id. at 134.
43. Id. at 133.
44. Id.
45. United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
1990]
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machines used were not in "good operating condition ' 46 or were not
used "properly" 47 by the technician. Here, the scientific evidence
would fail the third prong because the otherwise accepted techniques
were applied improperly.
C. Frye Applied to DNA Fingerprinting
The few courts that addressed this issue prior to Castro all found
DNA fingerprinting admissible. In New York, three trial courts have
examined the issue though the problem has yet to reach the appellate
level.4 8 An appellate court in Florida has found DNA fingerprinting
admissible.49 A Maryland appellate court5" and the Superior Court of
the state of Washington5 have roached similar conclusions. Addi-
tionally, the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reported that "at
least nine other states had admitted DNA evidence at trial." 2
The admissibility of DNA fingerprinting has been challenged by
objections based on various levels of the Frye test. The second and
third prongs have been the most common subjects of objections; how-
ever, most third prong objections have been either misunderstood or
poorly argued and actually have been decided on second prong
grounds.5" This dilemma in all likelihood has been the downfall of
the objection.
Andrews v. State54 was one of the first criminal cases in which
DNA fingerprinting evidence was introduced against a defendant.
The court admitted the evidence, stating that "DNA print identifica-
tion appears based on proven scientific principles."55 The court added
that the testing laboratory employed "accepted scientific tech-
niques."' 56 Testimony given by scientists employed by the testing lab-
oratory suggested that those techniques were followed in Andrews.57
46. Id. at 93.
47. Id.
48. People v. Lopez, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1989, at 29, col. 1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.); People v. Wesley,
140 Misc. 2d 306, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1988); In re Baby Girl S, 140 Misc. 2d 299, 532
N.Y.S.2d 634 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
49. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (admitting DNA
fingerprinting evidence for identification purposes), rev. denied, 542 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 1989).
50. Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 556 A.2d 230 (1989).
51. State v. Cauthron, No. 88-1-1-012533 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1989).
52. Kennedy v. State, 545 So. 2d 214 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 258
(1989).
53. See, e.g., Andrews, 533 So. 2d at 841.
54. Id. at 843.
55. Id. at 850.
56. Id. at 851.
57. Id. at 847.
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Thus, the court concluded that all three prongs of the Frye test were
satisfied and admitted the evidence.
A closer look at Andrews suggests that the second prong was, in
actuality, the only one questioned. Defense attorneys argued that a
gel used in the test was unproven, bringing into question the general
reliability of the techniques employed by the testing laboratory.5" The
defense did not object to how these techniques were applied, however,
despite the complete absence of unbiased evidence to show that the
testing lab properly adhered to accepted procedure in this case. Only
one expert who testified was not an employee of the testing labora-
tory, and thus, presumptively unbiased. This expert confirmed that
the techniques claimed by the laboratory were acceptable, but added
that he was not present when the particular test in question was per-
formed.59 His absence made it impossible for him to comment on
prong three criteria. Thus, it appears that the court based its decision
to admit the DNA fingerprinting evidence solely on satisfaction of
prong two concerns. 6°
Other attacks on DNA admissibility have also focused on prongs
one and two. In People v. Wesley,61 defense attorneys opposed the
admission of DNA fingerprint evidence on two grounds. First, the
laboratory's "procedures, methodology, and quality controls [were]
not adequate to assure reliability and accuracy of its results."' 62 Sec-
ond, the laboratory's "population studies [were] inadequate to estab-
lish a claimed power of identity for its results."'63 Again, these claims
focus on DNA technology generally, challenging admissibility by
questioning the acceptability of the techniques employed. The
defense made no attempt to challenge on third prong concerns, such
as error in the mechanical application of existing, appropriate
techniques. 64
These cases demonstrate that attacks addressed at the first and
second prongs are generally futile.65 Andrews and Wesley focused on
these issues, and the tests were admitted, in accordance with the vir-
58. Id. at 849.
59. Id. at 847.
60. Id.
61. People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 317, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 650 (Albany County Ct.
1988).
62. Id. at 307, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See generally Kennedy v. State, 545 So. 2d 214 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 258 (1989); Yorke v. State, 315 Md. 578, 556 A.2d 214 (1989); State v. Cauthron, No. 88-
1-1-012533 (Wash. Sup. Ct. Jan. 18, 1989).
1990]
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tual unanimity of the scientific community." The theory behind
DNA fingerprinting is unquestioned in the scientific community.67
Additionally, there is no dispute that testing laboratories have devel-
oped reliable DNA fingerprinting techniques.68
However, under the Frye three-tiered analysis, the general
acceptance of theory and technique is insufficient alone to justify the
admission of novel scientific evidence. 69 The third prong of the Frye
test demands that appropriate techniques must be applied correctly
each time a particular test is performed. People v. Castro 70 provided
the first successful challenge to the admissibility of DNA fingerprint-
ing evidence by concentrating on the third prong-clearly the appro-
priate focus for examination of DNA fingerprinting evidence in
criminal trials.
III. PEOPLE V. CASTRO
On February 5, 1987, Vilma Ponce, at the time seven months
pregnant, and her two-year-old daughter were stabbed to death in
New York City.7 Police later arrested Joseph Castro, charged him
with the crime, and seized his wristwatch which appeared to be splat-
tered with blood.72
Prosecutors attempted to identify the blood on Castro's wrist-
watch through DNA fingerprinting tests performed by the Lifecodes
Corporation.7 a Lifecodes' testing report stated that the DNA from
the blood sample matched Vilma Ponce's DNA and that the fre-
quency of such a match in the general public was only one in
189,200,000. 71 Defense attorneys objected to the admission of the
Lifecodes report on the grounds that, in this instance, Lifecodes failed
to follow the generally accepted techniques needed to ensure reliabil-
ity.75 A twelve-week-long Frye hearing resulted in the first successful
challenge to the introduction of DNA fingerprinting evidence in an
American court.
The success of the challenge resulted from its focus on the third
prong of the Frye test. Defense attorneys apparently realized that
66. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1220.
67. Thompson & Ford, supra note 1, at 50.
68. Id. at 54.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Ridling, 350 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
70. 144 Misc. 2d 956, 980, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 999 (Sup. Ct. 1989).
71. N.Y. Times, August 15, 1989, at BI, col. 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Lewin, supra note 3, at 1034.
75. N.Y. Times, supra note 71, at BI, col. 1.
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prong one and two objections were fruitless. Therefore, they pre-
vented the discussion from lapsing into first or second prong issues by
providing sufficient evidence of Lifecodes failures to follow accepted
procedures."6 For instance, the defense pointed out that blood sam-
ples from Castro's watch were asceptically obtained and most likely
included bacterial contaminants; at least one of the Lifecodes' conclu-
sions vas ruled inadmissible because of the possibility that the sample
had been degraded by bacterial exposure. The defense also challenged
Lifecodes' failure to provide both male and female "control lanes" in
a test to determine the gender of the sample's source. Other proce-
dural errors raised by the defense cast serious doubt on Lifecodes'
conclusion that the blood on Castro's watch indeed was the blood of
Vilma Ponce. Accordingly, the court rejected the DNA fingerprint-
ing evidence.
It is noteworthy that the defense in Castro did not challenge
underlying theories or the availability of reliable techniques, tacitly
conceding that DNA fingerprinting is accepted in the scientific com-
munity to the point that it no longer requires first or second prong
analysis. Rather, the defense focused on potential problems resulting
from the failure to follow accepted procedures. The court accepted
this approach, and confined its analysis to prong three issues.
Moreover, recognizing that discovery of procedural errors may
be extremely difficult, the Castro court provided for extensive discov-
ery to ensure that specific data concerning test techniques are avail-
able to the non-introducing party.7" First, the party who intends to
introduce DNA fingerprint evidence must give notice of that intent as
early as possible.78 Second, the party seeking to admit test results
must provide the non-introducing party with: (1) true copies of all
autoradiographs 9 run and an opportunity to examine the originals;
(2) copies of laboratory books; (3) copies of control tests run on the
material utilized; (4) copies of the reports developed by the testing
laboratory describing the methods used to declare a match or non-
match of samples, with size measurements and statistical information
if applicable; (5) copies of the report developed by the testing labora-
tory which was given to the proponent; (6) a statement by the testing
laboratory describing the methods used to calculate the allele frequen-
cies in the relevant population; (7) a copy of the data pool for each
loci examined; (8) a certificate by the testing laboratory that the
76. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 974, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 996 (Sup.. Ct. 1989).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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method used to declare a match was the same used to determine the
allele frequency in the population; (9) a statement of any con-
taminents and the tests performed to determine their origin; and (10)
a statement describing any observed defects or laboratory errors and
the laboratory's explanation thereof.
80
Short of having an expert present to witness the testing proce-
dures, the opportunity to examine the autorads provides the best pro-
tection against unreliable tests, and should reveal any potential
problems with them.81 Because mistakes in procedures that are not
apparent through examination of the autorads usually results in blank
autorads, the interests of the non-introducing party would be suffi-
ciently safeguarded.82 If shortcuts have been taken by the testing lab-
oratory, they would be apparent to an expert at this juncture. Thus,
the extensive discovery mandated by the Castro court provides the
non-introducing party with an opportunity to refute the reliability of
the tests, and ensures access to the factual data necessary to mount a
successful third prong challenge.
Castro cuts to the heart of the potential problems with DNA fin-
gerprinting. Though, in fairness to earlier courts, Castro was made
easier by a statement provided by a conference attended by experts
provided by both the prosecution and defense. Although unprece-
dented, the court's decision to allow the conference met squarely with
the interpreted purpose of Frye-type hearings. Courts have read Frye
to say that the requirement of general acceptance of the proposed
technology in the scientific community "assures that those most quali-
fied to assess the general validity of a scientific method will have the
determinative voice. '"83
The statement produced by the conference of experts plainly
indicated that the tests sought to be admitted in Castro were fraught
with numerous problems.8 4 However, these problems did not involve
80. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
81. See generally id. at 973-79, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 995-99.
82. Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841, 849 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1988).
83. United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
84. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 974, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 996-98. The tests performed by Lifecodes
presented numerous problems. To start, the blood stains on the watch were aseptically
obtained and probably included bacterial contaminants. Id. Adequate controls were not used
to ensure that the DNA bands that provided the basis for conclusion of the tests were not of
bacterial origin. Id. As well, an autorad used to declare a match by Lifecodes was declared
inadmissible because testing was inadequate to determine whether a band present on the watch
sample lane was a true homozygous band or a heterozygous band that had been degraded by
bacterial exposure. Id.
Additionally, efforts to determine the sex of the source of the blood sample were
inconclusive as scientifically accepted procedures require both male and female control lanes to
assure the procedures worked correctly. Id. In the instant case, the autoradiograph run to
[Vol. 45:243
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the underlying theory or the availability of reliable techniques to effec-
tually utilize those theories. The problems resulted from a failure to
follow the accepted procedures. This focus demonstrates the impor-
tance of the Castro ruling. DNA fingerprinting has reached such a
level of acceptance in the scientific community that it no longer
requires first or second prong analysis. These methods are accepted
now and will remain accepted absent a rediscovery of the wheel.
However, the problem still remains that the discovery of such errors
may be extremely difficult. In order to address this concern and to
lessen the prejudicial nature the tests may have, Castro provides
extensive standards which can minimize the risks.85
IV. ADDRESSING THE PREJUDICIAL NATURE PROBLEM
As the defense conceded in Castro, DNA fingerprinting has made
the transition from unproven theory to accepted scientific procedure
and practice. The ready acceptance of the theory underlying DNA
fingerprinting in the scientific community, and the fact that reliable
techniques exist, have moved this technology past the first two prongs
of the Frye test. In this sense, those doors have been shut and need
not be reopened. Now, practitioners must place their emphasis on
whether the testing laboratories have followed the accepted procedure
in each case.
The acknowledgement of DNA fingerprinting as a viable tech-
nology, however, presents its own evidentiary problem: the prejudicial
impact of evidence cloaked in the mantle of high technology and sci-
entific respectability. The Castro court attempted to minimize this
impact by focusing narrowly on the third prong of the Frye test. In
determine the sex of the sample did not contain a male control lane and thus was unacceptable.
Id. Later autorads that included a male control lane could not be used as a control for earlier
tests as inherent experimental differences may render tests run separately useless for
comparison. Id.
Further, an autoradiograph performed using what is commonly known as "Cooke's
probe" also presented admissibility problems. Id. This autorad showed five bands of DNA in
the watch blood sample lane and only three in the victim's blood control lane. Id. Though
Lifecode's expert testified that the additional two bands were "most likely bacterial or plasmid
bands," failure to conduct further experiments failed to eliminate the possibility that these
bands were human DNA which would have proven conclusively that the watch blood sample
did not originate from Vilma Ponce. Id.
Additionally, it was apparent that Lifecodes was not using the appropriate allele
frequencies when calculating the probability that a match occurred coincidentally. Id. The
laboratory may have used the probabilities calculated from computer-determined matches in
instances where a match was declared visually. Id. While visually declared matches present
no problem alone, the appropriate frequencies are larger for visual matches than computer-
declared matches. Id. Thus, if computer frequencies were used for visually declared matches,
the final probability-in this case 1 in 189,200,000-would be grossly mistated. Id.
85. Id. at 978, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
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theory, this focus would limit objections to prong three issues, and
make it impossible for the discussion to shift back to prongs one and
two. However, the Castro court did not stop at merely narrowing the
inquiry to prong three issues. As an additional safeguard against the
prejudicial impact of novel scientific evidence, the Castro court placed
the burden of proving that prong three criteria were met upon the
introducing party. In other words, DNA fingerprint evidence will not
be admitted unless the introducing party first satisfies the court that
proper testing procedures were followed.
Opponents to this contention claim that it is better to admit
novel scientific evidence and let the jury determine its relative worth.
In United States v. Bailer, 86 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit reported that it is better to "admit relevant scien-
tific evidence in the same manner as other expert testimony and allow
its weight to be attacked by cross-examination and refutation."87
Under this approach, all conclusions presented by the testing labora-
tory are admissible. The opponent would then have the opportunity
to refute and rebut the expert's claims. While this theory may apply
where traditional fingerprinting or blood typing is involved, its effi-
cacy is questionable when more complex procedures are involved.8"
As Gianelli notes in discussing polygraph test admissibility, "empiri-
cal support for this view is lacking ... [and] the assumption of jury
culpability provides a shaky foundation upon which to construct an
approach to the admissibility of novel scientific evidence."89
One can argue that, while not perfect, even unreliable tests have
some probative value. In Castro, the conclusions of the experts were
not induced fraudulently or obtained by mistaken interpretation or
scientific error.90 In fact, the original conclusions of the experts may
well have been correct. Defense experts based their objections to the
findings on certain procedural lapses which left open the possibility of
other interpretations.9" The fact that a procedural lapse was uncov-
ered does not necessarily suggest that the claimed scientific findings
were wrong, just that the results were not as reliable as possible.92
Claims by experts that additional bands were probably of bacterial
origin were not necessarily incorrect. However, they did not exclude
86. 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975).
87. Id. at 466.
88. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1220.
89. Id. at 1222.
90. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 978-80, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 998-99 (Sup. Ct. 1989).





Also, the tests themselves provide certain safeguards inherent in
the procedures. Expert testimony in Wesley suggests that "it is
impossible under the scientific procedures of DNA fingerprinting...
to get a 'false positive'-i.e., to identify the wrong individual as the
contributor of the DNA being tested." 94 "If the tests were performed
improperly .. . no result at all would be registered."9'
Additionally, all other errors cited in Castro dealt with the fail-
ure to exclude alternative possibilities, not that the announced find-
ings were inherently wrong.96 Certainly, the court could have
admitted the evidence and permitted the jury to determine its worth
in light of defense exptrt's claims that the tests were inconclusive.
However, courts have excluded this alternative where exaggerated
public opinion of a particular technique's accuracy makes its use prej-
udicial or likely to mislead the jury.97 For example, in this particular
instance, it seems highly unlikely that a group of non-scientist jurors
hearing refutation evidence which suggests that apparent homozygous
band matches may in actuality be a false positive because of the possi-
bility of bacterial degradation of truly heterozygous bands, can suc-
cessfully and intelligently process such information to overcome a
prosecution's simple assertion that chances are one in 189,200,000
that the blood on defendant's watch came from someone other than
the victim. 98
Furthermore, the techniques employed by testing laboratories
are frequently difficult to review. After all, these laboratories are in
business to make money, and in-depth scrutiny of the particular pro-
cedures involved can make years of secret, not to mention expensive,
research available to competing labs. Expert witnesses with firsthand
knowledge as to the performance of the appropriate techniques usu-
ally work for the laboratory whose process is being questioned, and
judicial acceptance of a particular technique could lead to an eco-
nomic windfall for the scientists. Experts who are disinterested and
impartial frequently are not used.99 At the Very least, the specter of
bias and partiality exists."°o
93. Id.
94. People v. Wesley, 140 Misc. 2d 306, 310, 533 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645-46 (Albany County
Ct. 1988).
95. Id.
96. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d at 969, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
97. United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
98. See generally Castro, 144 Misc.2d at 956, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 985.
99. Thompson & Ford, supra note 1, at 60.
100. Id.
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Additionally, these experts are for the most part scientists and
not lawyers. Scientific theory and experimental method often use dif-
ferent standards than those which are appropriate for judicial proced-
ings. 10 Where reasoned scientific guesses are made in the furtherance
of research and experimentation, their reliability can be checked by
further experimentation and errors are frequently uncovered. 102
When these same guesses are made in an unchecked DNA fingerprint
test, possible errors are likely to remain hidden.1 3 Typically, the only
results which get additional attention from the attending scientists are
those that are inconsistent with the prosecution's theory of the case.'°4
Despite these criticisms, it is important to stress that neither the
theme of this Comment nor the Castro court's reasoned opinion sug-
gests that DNA fingerprinting is an evil which has no place in Ameri-
can jurisprudence. On the contrary, the tremendous potential these
tests have for solving cases with an impressive degree of certainty
should be exploited. At the same time, the introduction of innovative
scientific techniques to the courtroom undoubtedly creates its share of
problems. As demonstrated by the scientific experts and the court in
Castro, these problems can be addressed squarely, with honesty and
integrity. However, the courts must keep in mind that the aura of
scientific certainty that accompanies DNA fingerprinting technology
can also work to the undeserved prejudice of the defendant.
A potential problem that surfaces in Castro is revealed in the
court's statement that DNA fingerprinting tests are "presently relia-
ble and will remain so for the next six months."'0 5 Taken at face
value, and possibly out of context, this statement contradicts the
important point that the remainder of the decision makes.'°6 By stat-
ing that the techniques will remain reliable for only six months, the
court suggests that the techniques involved can still be questioned and
that the admissibility focus remains at the second prong. If this is
what was intended, the opinion loses its appeal. Alternatively, a more
plausible explanation of the statement, and one that fits within the
theme of the remainder of the opinion, is that these techniques will
remain state of the art for the next six months. Even though better
tests may be developed at that point, the reliability of the present tests
is not questioned.
101. Gianelli, supra note 7, at 1220.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Thompson & Ford, supra note 1, at 56.
105. People v. Castro, 144 Misc. 2d 956, 973, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 995 (Sup. Ct. 1989).




Castro has made a statement concerning the status of DNA fin-
gerprinting in the courtroom. It is possible that our desire to fight the
war on violent crime has caused us to force this new technology on
the system before the judiciary has had the opportunity to develop
appropriate methods to insure its proper use. Nevertheless, DNA fin-
gerprinting is here to stay and its enormous potential as a probative
tool should be harnessed correctly. Theory and technology are no
longer the appropriate points from which to attack these tests; recent
case law clearly demonstrates that DNA fingerprinting technology
satisfies the first and second prongs of the Frye analysis. Castro pro-
vides a clear directive that DNA fingerprint evidence will be admitted
once the moving party shows that they were produced through the
proper use of accepted techniques. The burden will then fall on the
opposing party to show why the tests should not be admitted. Castro
provides a strong procedural framework for the admission of DNA
fingerprinting evidence, and puts the legal community on notice that
additional study and preparation by attorneys may be needed to pro-
tect their clients from unjust prejudice.
JEFFREY A. NORMAN
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